Fertility In The West: The C.I.A. Speaks.

In August of 1990, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released an unclassified report on "Youth Deficits: An Emerging Population Problem." The subject matter of the report was limited to economics and the economic implications of dwindling numbers in the west. Its introduction states:

"A population trend that portends new societal stress is beginning to emerge in a number of countries around the globe - the development of age structures with unprecedented low numbers of young adults. Since the early 1970s, the average number of children born to women in nearly every developed country has fallen below the number of children required for a population to 'replace' itself. The persistence of low fertility means that successive infant cohorts become smaller, eventually resulting in a population with a small proportion of young adults. In 1980,1 there were no "youth deficit" countries, which we define as having less than 15 percent of their population in the young adult age group (15 to 24 years old), among countries with a population of 5 million or more. By 1985, however, seven countries faced such deficits and by the end of the 1980s, nine more emerged. On the basis of the number of births over the last two decades, we anticipate youth deficits in at least 29 countries - including almost all industrialized countries and a number of key developing countries - by the year 2010."

The CIA report only vaguely hints at the implications of the trend, stating that "youth deficits" might be an indication of severe or chronic labor shortages among low birthrate nations, as well as the probability of population decline in the near future.

"Prior to World War II, population growth was considered a sign of a healthy society, and low-growth countries were alarmed at the situation they confronted. In the postwar years, however, growth became viewed as a threat and zero growth was the demographic goal. The 1990s are likely to bring this full circle as the consequences of youth deficits become more evident.

"Because youth deficits are unique in modern history, the full range and magnitude of potential problems are not yet clear. Nevertheless, on the basis of the experience of countries that have already begun to feel the effects of this demographic phenomenon, youth-deficit countries could confront several interrelated sets of problems."

The CIA notes, for instance:
"Chronic and potentially several labor shortages are likely to occur over the next two decades and beyond. Based on current demographic tends, problems will become increasingly evident during the 1990s in Western Europe and Japan and during the first decade of the 21st century in the Pacific Rim and Eastern Europe - possibly at a time when economic reforms begun during the 1990s are beginning to gain momentum.

"Labor problems will occur in two ways. The most immediate impact will result from an insufficient pool of entry-level personnel. In 29 developed and developing countries this pool will decrease by 35 to 40 million people - 9 to 12 percent - over the next two decades. The most severely affected countries in Western Europe and Japan will see 25- to 35-percent declines.

...Problems are likely to become even more severe over the longer term. By the second decade of the 21st century, almost all deficit countries will experience declines in absolute numbers."