Current Status of Research and Thinking about the Effect of Government Policies on Fertility Levels in Developed Countries.

By Sloj, S. Litofe

Ph.D in Political Economy & Public Policy, Specialist in Comparative and Developmental Economy
Retrospective. In most developed countries, the demographic transition is completed. Life expectancy is at record high, and fertility is at or below the replacement level. For instance, in 1994, women in Western Europe averaged only 1.6 children each. In the United States, women averaged 2.0 children. Hence, most Western governments are mostly concerned with the declining numbers of younger workers at the lower end of the age scale, and the rising numbers of pensioners at the upper end.
In France, the number of 15 to 19 years olds, the traditional ages for entry into labor force has been declining since the 1980s, and is expected to fall from 4.2 million in 1990 to 3.5 million by 2025 (Carl Haub & Math F. Riche, 1994). Further, it is projected that by the year 2025, over 84% of the world's working age population (ages 15 to 64) may live in developing countries, up to 75% in 1990, and 65% in 1950. It is also projected that, only a relatively small share of these workers will emigrate, and most of those will go to other developing countries.
Given these realities, how most developed countries are coping with these issues? In this essay, we will non-exclusively focus on Italy and Sweden.

A. Fertility Decline in Italy
In two decades, Italy's total fertility rate (TFR) dropped by half. In 1972, it was 2.4 and by 1993 it become only 1.2. Two basic reasons account for this situation: The first reason is the change in gender role, and the second reason is the lack of social protection for children.
Indeed, in Italy, female educational attainment has sensibly increased in the last two decades. In the young birth cohorts, the girls now have higher average levels of schooling than the boys. Girls' expectations and ambitions have sensibly increased. The age-old division of labor between man (the provider) and woman (the mother tending the home) is no longer accepted.
Now, young Italian women wish to have other roles in life than that of spouse or mother. They seek a social status based on jobs that they themselves hold, and the related financial rewards such jobs provide which, in turn, increase their degree of independence. The link between these attitudes and fertility behavior is direct. In fact, our firm conviction is that, women who engage in repeated childbearing behavior run the risk of being relegated to the traditional role of "spouse and mother tending the home".
The second explanation to Italy's fertility decline is the lack of social protection for children. Indeed, the share of child benefits within the total security budget has markedly shrunk during the period of fertility decline. For instance, the share of child benefits within the total security budget passed from 13.3% in 1970 to 3.9% in 1992. That is, the cost associate with bearing a child has sensibly increased. As a result, young couples react either by postponing childbearing, or by electing to have only one or two children.

B. Fertility Decline in Sweden
Sweden, as to it, has a long history of below the replacement level (i.e., since around the 1920s). The fear of population decline pushed the Swedish government to adopt the policy of free choice.
In fact, in Sweden, the government assures couples' right to contraception and access to family planning services. In addition, it introduces family allowances to ease the material burdens of childbearing. As a result, between 1935-1939 TFR rose from 1.7 to 1.9. A postwar baby boom brought the rate above 2.0, but a precipitous decline resumed in 1964, and by 1968 fertility once again falls below replacement.
However, it should be pointed out that in contrast to Italy, in Sweden, fertility never falls below 1.6 for the following reasons:
1. Labor shortage in the 1960s due, in part, to low birth rates during the period between the two wars, and the support that public authorities accord to women in labor force (i.e., 2/5 of these jobs are part-time jobs). Moreover, 85% of women of labor force age hold jobs outside the family. This is twice that of Italy.
2. Most studies assumed that the relationship between women's status and the level of fertility is necessarily negative. However, the case of Sweden shows that this assumption is actually very simplistic. Sweden social arrangements demonstrate that women's status and the level of fertility can be balanced. In this regard, one of the factors that characterized Sweden social arrangement has been the co-habitation of couples. Indeed, because of the co-habitation, the divorce rate has dramatically declined, and the negative social stigma associated with the single parenthood has almost evaporated.
3. The Swedish government has kept the purchasing power of family allowances relatively stable.
4. The burden of children's upbringing is more equally share between father, mother, and between the family and the community, than in most other societies in Western Europe.
5. The share of women participation in political arena has considerably increased. In fact, Sweden has always had the highest percentage of women in politic and workforce than any other western country.
These Sweden strategies reinforce Rindfuss and Brewster analyze regarding the relationship between the increase rate of participation in the paid labor by women, particularly those in childbearing age, and fertility level in the United States and other advanced industrial societies.
Indeed, according to Rindfuss and Brewster, the primary dimensions of role incompatibility i.e., the social organization of work and ofchildcare, vary across advanced industrial economies, leading to the variation in the degree of conflict between the mother and worker role.
As such, Rindfuss and Brewster question the hypothesis according to which: "fertility rates in industrial and post-industrial societies will decline toward zero as female labor force participation rates increase, because of the difficulties of accommodating the demands of childrearing to the requisites of market work". To them, the degree of role incompatibility experienced by working mothers may be one of the keys to understanding variation in fertility levels across developed countries, and within developed countries over time.
According to Rindfuss and Brewster, the degree of role incompatibility mediates the relationship between labor force participation and fertility. In this respect, they argue that, ceteris paribus, social policy packages (i.e., parity dependent cash allowances, paid maternity leave, state organized daycare centers for preschool-age children, etc) that reduce the role conflict experienced by working mothers can facilitate higher fertility (i.e., France, former East Germany, Sweden, etc).
Subsequently, anything that decreased the accessibility, quality, or acceptability of existing childcare arrangements, or substantially increased the cost of childcare would likely lead to a swift decline in fertility.

C. Minimum Social Insurance in Developed Countries
Given the above considerations, most developed countries now provide, as a minimum, the following as part of their social insurance programs:
* Medical cares during pregnancy and childbirth, * Mandated period of compensated pre-and post-maternity leave, * Health supervision of infants and young children, * Cash allowances for families with children up to school-leaving age, or beyond it if the child is obtaining Job training or higher education, * Assistance in obtaining and paying for suitable housing -either low cost loans for purchasing or furnishing a home, or subsidies for rental accommodation, * Some form of income tax relief for dependent children.
However, despite these policies, most Western countries are still far from resolving the problems associated with their perpetual below-replacement fertility. Now, the question is, why is it that these governments' interventions had failed? And how to fix it?
According to Mclntosh, the policies packages mentioned above had failed because of the following obstacles:
1. Most Western governments do not have the financial resources capable of consistently implementing these policies.
2. Regardless of how sound these policy packages may be, as matter of fact, in most developed countries, ordinary people are not really motivated to have more children.
3. Being very democratic societies, most Western governments are unwilling to introduce policies in areas that do not command a broad societal consensus. Gunnar Myrdal's lecture at Harvard University in 1940 entitled: "Population: A Problem for democracy", is a telling example in this matter.
How to fix it? According to Paul Demeny, re-linking fertility behavior and economic security in old age is the best way to increase fertility in most developed countries. This because, to Paul Demeny, the operation of both collective social security arrangement and income transfers through time by means of capital markets is the assumption that the numerical ratio between the sizes of successive generations --between those in retirement and those in labor force ages- stays within a certain normal range.
When aggregate fertility is maintained substantially below replacement level, that ratio eventually rises and approaches values put great stain on functioning of any conceivable system providing economic sustenance for retired. However, as Demeny himself recognizes it, his proposition needs more empirical data to validate it.

Conclusion
Given the above considerations, it is clear that fertility decline, family, and social policy in contemporary developed countries are complex issues. Indeed, as Rindfuss and Brewster's discussions shows, cultural factors (i.e., ethnicity, religion, language), social policy packages, and the effective usage of contraceptive methods are important factors that account for the rise or the decline of fertility. Moreover, predictions on post-demographic transition period are not clear. As such, what will happen to fertility level in the aftermath of post-transition era remains an enigma that needs to be seriously investigated.
Sloj, S. Litofe, Ph.D Silika@Almaak.usc.edu